Common reason to believe and framing effect in the team reasoning theory: an experimental approach by Leonardo Becchetti et al.
Common reason to believe and 
framing effect in the team 

















Common reason to believe and framing effect in the team reasoning theory:  















The present paper is aimed at empirically verifying the role of the “common reason to believe” 
(Sugden 2003) and of framing (Bacharach 1999 and 2006) within the theory of team reasoning. The 
analysis draws on data collected trough a Traveler’s Dilemma experiment. To study the role of the 
common  reason  to  believe,  players’  belief  in  their  counterpart’s  choice  are  elicited  and  the 
correlation between the endorsement of team reasoning and beliefs is considered. With respect to 
the idea of frame proposed by Bacharach, we study the effect of the reduction of social distance on 
the  probability  that  the  “we-frame”  comes  to  players’  mind.  Social  distance  is  decreased  by 
introducing a meeting between the two players after the game. It is shown that the common reason 
to believe appropriately explains the internal logic of team reasoning and that the reduction of social 
distance makes the “we-frame” more likely. 
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1. Introduction  
Evidence from laboratory experiments often provides findings which dispute the predictions of 
theories of decision which assume that player are perfectly rational and purely self-interested. This 
is the case, in particular of experimental social dilemmas where a significant level of cooperation is 
observed not only in repeated games, but also when games are one-shot (e.g. Ladyard 1995; Goeree 
and Holt 2001; Camerer 2003).  
An example of social dilemma game in which both the full rationality hypothesis and the purely 
self-interest hypothesis have been disputed is the Traveler’s Dilemma, introduced by Kaushik Basu 
in 1994. The parable associated with the game concerns two travelers returning from a remote 
island who lose their luggage, containing the same type of souvenir, because of the airline company. 
In order to be reimbursed, they have to write down on a piece of paper the value of the souvenir 
which may range between 2 and 100 (in the original Basu 1994 paper). If the travelers write a 
different number, they are reimbursed with the minimum amount declared. Moreover, a reward 
equal to 2 is paid to the traveler who declares the lower value, while a penalty of the same amount 
is paid by the traveler who writes the higher value. In case the two claims are exactly the same, the 
two travelers receive the declared value without reward or penalty. Given game characteristics, if 
both  of  them  want  to  maximize  their  monetary  payoffs,  the  (2,2)  outcome  is  the  only  Nash 
equilibrium of the game and this is true independently of the size of the penalty or reward (hereafter 
also P|R). 
Basu  (1994)  rises  the  problem  of  the  implausibility  of  the  Nash  solution  -  far  below  the 
(100,100) cooperative outcome - and suggests that a more plausible result is the one in which each 
player declares a large number, in the belief that the other does the same. The scarce predictive 
capacity of the Nash equilibrium in the Traveler’s Dilemma has been confirmed by experimental 
contributions which also emphasized the role of the severity of the punishment in determining the 
Nash solution. Goeree and Holt (2001) and Capra et al. (1999) showed that the less severe is the 
punishment the less likely is the Nash equilibrium solution in one-shot (Goeree and Holt 2001) and   3
in repeated (Capra et al.  1999) Traveler’s  Dilemma. Rubinstein (2007) showed  that around  50 
percent  of  more  than  4.500  subjects  who  played  an  online  version  of  the  Traveler’s  Dilemma 
(henceforth also TD) opted for the maximum choice (the minimum and maximum choice allowed 
were 180$ and 300$ respectively and P|R was 5$).
1  
The  payoff  structure  of  the  Traveler’s  Dilemma  –  which  is  characterized  by  a  large  sub-
optimality of the Nash equilibrium with respect to the cooperative outcome - makes it a suitable 
game to experimentally approach the idea of team reasoning, that has been proposed in different 
terms by David Hodgson (1967), Donald Regan (1980), Margaret Gilbert (1989), Susan Hurley 
(1989), Robert Sugden (1993, 2000, 2003), Martin Hollis (1998) and Michael Bacharach (1997, 
1999, 2006). The aim of this paper is not to present the various approaches to team reasoning (to 
this aim see Gold and Sugden 2008). Our analysis is aimed at empirically verifying the role of 
“common reason to believe” (Sugden 2003) and of framing (Bacharach 1999 and 2006) within the 
theory of team reasoning. We provide an original empirical test of disputed theoretical questions 
related to the internal logic of team reasoning and to the reason explaining its endorsement by the 
members of a group. 
In  section  2,  after  having  stressed  the  common  thread  characterizing  the  theory  of  team 
reasoning, we: a) discuss the idea of common reason to believe within this theory (Sugden 2003); b) 
discuss  the  role  of  framing  in  prompting  the  endorsement  of  team  reasoning  according  to  the 
Bacharach’s approach; c) present in detail our empirical aims connected to these two theoretical 
issues. In section 3, we illustrate the rationale of our experiment and describe its design. In section 4 
and 5 we empirically analyze the ideas of common reason to believe and framing within the theory 




                                                
1 Subjects who participated in the online experiment were not paid. However, Rubinstein stresses that the distribution of 
answers given by these subjects is similar to that of Goeree and Holt (2001) when they use the low P|R.   4
2. Theoretical Background and Aims 
2.1. Team reasoning and common reason to believe. 
Team reasoning literature considers the possibility that individuals may identify in team and 
may use modes of team reasoning (“we-mode”) in which decisions are taken by individuals as if 
they were not distinct from the team. The difference between team reasoning (we also will refer to 
the theory by saying we-thinking) and the classic individual rationality is that the former lead to 
say: “It would be good for us if we did…”. In other words, when a decision has to be taken, an 
agent who reasons according to  the  we-mode wonders “What should we  do” instead  of “what 
should  I  do”.  Team  reasoning  is  an  explanation  of  the  widely  observed  deviation  from  Nash 
solution in games such as Public Good Games and the Prisoners Dilemma (see Sugden 2003 for a 
theoretical application of team reasoning to this game). 
The concept of “reason to believe” (Lewis 1969 and Cubitt and Sugden 2003) has been used by 
Sugden (2003) to tackle what he called the internal (to the logic of team reasoning) problem of the 
team reasoning theory. “The internal problem is that, from the viewpoint of any individual, the 
validity or acceptability of team reasoning, narrowly defined, may be conditional on his confidence 
that  other  members  of  the  team  are  reasoning  in  a  similar  way”
2  (Sugden  2003,  p.168).  Two 
examples are used by Sugden to explain this concept. The Footballers’ Problem considers two 
players (A and B) in the same football team. A has to pass the ball to B since a player in the 
opposing team is converging on him. A can pass the ball rightwards or leftwards. Correspondingly, 
there are two directions (left and right) in which B can run to catch the ball. If A chooses left and B 
chooses left too, there is a 10% chance to score a goal for the team. If both choose right the chance 
is  11%.  Otherwise,  there  is  no  chance  to  score.  The  two  players  act  simultaneously  without 
possibility of communication.  
Suppose that the two players reason as members of the same team and they want to score a goal. 
Suppose also that A thinks that B, for whatever reason, is going to choose left. In this case, even 
                                                
2 A footnote specifies that “team reasoning, narrowly defined” means “a mode of reasoning, followed by one individual, 
which prescribes that he should perform his part of whichever profile is best for the team” (Sugden 2003, p.168).   5
though (right, right) is the best solution for the team, it does not justify A in choosing right given 
her belief in B’s choice. It seems, then, that belief in other’s behavior has a fundamental role in the 
logic of team reasoning. This role may be better understood by considering the Prisoners Dilemma 
which highlights a second form of the internal problem of the team reasoning theory (Sugden 2003). 
In  fact,  in  the  Footballers’  Problem  the  lack  of  confidence  in  B  does  not  undermine  A’s 
commitment to obtain the best objective for the team. It only generates a particular kind of joint 
action as the mean of achieving this object. On the contrary, Prisoners’ Dilemma represents a case 
in which lack of confidence in other members of a team eliminates commitment to the aim of the 
team itself. The payoff matrix of a standard Prisoners’ Dilemma is reported in table 1. 
 







                       Player 2 
  Cooperate  Defect 
Cooperate   3,3  -1,4 
Defect  4,-1  0,0 
 
Obviously, the best solution for the team made by the two players in the Prisoner’s Dilemma is the 
couple of choices (Cooperate, Cooperate). Suppose that Player 1 believes that Player 2 will choose 
Defect. If Player 1 follows the team reasoning, she should play Cooperate even though players 2 
plays Defect. In fact, (Cooperate, Defect) generates a total payoff equal to 3 which is higher that the 
payoff generated by (Defect, Defect). It means that, given the payoff structure reported in table 1, 
team reasoning prescribes to cooperate regardless of other player’s choice. However, the belief that 
2 will defect raises doubts about the appropriateness of team reasoning for player 1. “In part, this is 
a matter of moral psychology: a person may be willing to play her part in a joint activity which 
benefits all parties, but not to pay for someone else’s free rides. There is also a conceptual issue. It 
is difficult to make sense of the idea that one person reasons ‘as a member of a team’ without   6
presupposing that she believes that there is a team of which she is a member. But, one might think, 
a two-person team is not something that one person can create unilaterally: for C [C and D are the 
two players in Sugden’s explanation] to conceive of {C, D} as a team, she has to conceive of D 
conceiving of {C, D} as a team. D’s choice of defect might be construed as asserting that, for her, 
{C, D} is not a team at all. Construing D’s expected choice in this way, C may conclude that there 
is no call for team reasoning, since there is no team to activate it.” (Sugden 2003, p.168). A risk of 
infinite regress arises: team reasoning may be valid or acceptable for a player (a member of a team) 
only if it is valid or acceptable for the others. Sugden tackles this problem by developing and 
applying to team reasoning the idea of common reason to believe which is defined as follows: 
“there is common reason to believe a proposition p in a set of individuals T if: (i) for all individuals 
i in T, i has reason to believe p; (ii) for all individuals i and j in T, i has reason to believe that j has 
reason to believe p; (iii) for all individuals i, j, and k in T, i has reason to believe that j has reason to 
believe that k has reason to believe p; and so on. (Gold and Sugden 2008, p. 302). Essentially, 
members of groups are not committed to reason as a team unless there is a common reason to 
believe that other members are doing the same (Smerilli 2008).  
The first goal of the present paper is to empirically verify the role of the common reason to 
believe in the theory of team reasoning. We elicited players’ belief in their counterpart’s choice and 
verified if the adoption of team reasoning is correlated with the belief that also the other member of 
the group (the counterpart in the Traveler’s Dilemma) is doing the same. We will show that this is 
the case.  
 
2.2. Team Reasoning, Framing and Reduction of Social Distance 
 
With respect to the Bacharach’s approach to team reasoning, we are in particular interested in 
his interpretation of the role that framing may have in prompting the endorsement of we-thinking in 
the members of a group. According to Bacharach, the possibility that we-thinking is implemented 
by agents is strictly connected with  the  idea of frames.  Subjects  who are  part  of a  group will   7
endorse team reasoning if the “we-frame” comes to their mind. A frame is intended as a set of 
concepts agents use when they think about a decision problem. Some situations may be more likely 
to stimulate the we-frame. For example, Bacharach (2006) states that the we-frame is normally 
induced by the Hi-Lo game
3 (see also Gold and Sugden 2008) and, even though less reliably, by the 
Prisoners’ Dilemma. The central question to understand this point is: how does we-frame come to 
mind? In his 1997 and 1999 contributions, Bacharach says that we-frame is based on the concept of 
“scope  for cooperation”  and  to  the “harmony  of  interests”.  Essentially,  in  this  perspective,  the 
probability of we-thinking is moderated by the temptation to reason as an individual, and varies 
with the strategic incentives to defect from the team. This temptation to avoid cooperation may be 
dictated by the underlying game harmony structure of the game (Tan and Zizzo 2008). Tan and 
Zizzo  (2008)  tackle  this  issue  empirically.  They  define  game  harmony  “as  a  generic  property 
describing  how  harmonious  or  disharmonious  the  interests  of  players  are,  as  embodied  in  the 
payoffs, capturing in a formal sense an aspect of how ‘cooperative’ we should consider a game to 
be”  (Tan  and  Zizzo  2008,  p.3)  and  show  that  game  harmony  is  positively  correlated  with 
cooperation. In the book edited by Gold and Sugden, Bacharach (2006) introduces the concept of 
“strong  interdependence”  and  proposes  the  idea  that  perceived  interdependence  promotes  team 
identification  and  endorsement  of  team  reasoning.  In  a  two  player  context,  perceived 
interdependence depends on three factors. 
1.  Common interest: assuming that s* and s are possible state of affairs, or outcomes of a 
game, subjects have common interest in s* over s, if both prefer s* to s. 
2.  Copower: subjects cannot reach s* alone, but they can together. 
3.  Solution of the game in standard game theory realizes s. 
                                                
3 A Hi-Lo game is a game where each player (suppose a two player game) has to choose one element from the same set 
of labels. Players’ payoffs are (ai, ai) if the two players choose the same label i and (0,0) otherwise (with ai > 0). 
Moreover, there is one label k such that ak is strictly greater than every other ai. If you suppose only two labels, the 




 H i g h   L o w  
High  a,a   0,0 
Low  0,0  b,b 
a>b>0   8
That is, group identification is stimulated if a possible outcome (s) which would be reached by 
endorsing  individual  standard  rationality  is  strictly  Pareto-dominated  by  another  outcome  (s*) 
which is preferred by both the players and which may be achieved if they act according to the team 
reasoning. 
Strong interdependence may prompt team reasoning but it does not imply that we-thinking is 
endorsed by all the subjects. “In a Prisoner’s Dilemma, players might see only, or most powerfully, 
the feature of common interest and reciprocal dependence which lie in the payoffs on the main 
diagonal. But they might see the problem in other ways. For example, someone might be struck by 
the  thought  that her  coplayer is  in a position  to double-cross her  by playing D [defect] in the 
expectation  that  she  will  play  C  [cooperate].  This  perceived  feature  might  inhibit  group 
identification. (2006, p.86)”. Both the Prisoners’ Dilemma and the Traveler’s Dilemma share the 
property of strong interdependence. They may be interpreted in terms of I-frame or we-frame by 
different  players,  depending  on  psychological  processes,  in the  same  way  the  drawing  used in 
Gestalt psychology can be seen as a duck or a rabbit by different subjects (Gold and Sugden 2008). 
The second aim of the present paper is linked with the psychological processes which may 
induce we-thinking to arise. Without having the ambition to clarify the mechanism behind these 
processes,  we  want  to  investigate  if  reducing  social  distance  (as  it  is  commonly  intended  in 
behavioral economics, see in the following pages)
4 in a standard Travelers’ Dilemma increases the 
likelihood that we-frame comes to mind of players. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first 
attempt to explicitly consider the effect of the reduction of social distance within the context of the 
theory of team reasoning. Social distance is decreased by introducing a meeting between the two 
players after the game. Its effect on the endorsement of team reasoning should be related to the fact 
that the idea of the team may become more salient when a meeting after the game is introduced.  
                                                
4 The reduction of social distance is related with the conditions illustrated by Bacharach (2006) which tend to promote a 
sense of identity such as “falling within the same natural social boundary (such as all being students, or elderly, or 
resident of the same town), or the same artificial category (such as being overestimators of the number of dots on a 
screen), meeting, having a common interests […]” Bacharach (2006, p.82).   9
A growing experimental literature on other regarding behavior shows that the probability of 
observing deviations from pure self-interest increases as the distance among subjects decreases.  
According  to  some  authors  this  evidence  can  be  explained  in  terms  of  a  negative  correlation 
between the social distance and the degree of empathy among subjects (Bohnet and Frey 1999a,b). 
An alternative explanation is based on the idea that the reduction of the social distance among the 
subjects  allows  for  a  social  norm  of  cooperation  or  fairness  to  become  effective  (Roth  1995, 
Hoffman,  McCabe and Smith 1996, Bohnet and  Frey 1999a). Manipulations  of social distance 
include:  face  to  face  interaction  (Isaac  and  Walker  1991,  Ladyard  1995,  Buchan,  Croson  and 
Johnson 2006), impersonal communication (Frohlich and Oppenheimer 1998), silent identification 
(Bohnet and Frey 1999b and Scharlemann et al. 2001), information about personal characteristics 
(Charness, Haruvy and Sonsino, 2007; Charness and Gneezy, 2008), and manipulation of language 
(Hoffman, McCabe and Smith 1996).  
Our analysis differs from these approaches in two respects. First, in our experiment anonymity 
is removed after the game, without introducing any form of pre-play communication. Second, the 
reduction of social distance has never been used in the Travelers’ Dilemma, a game characterized 
by the property of strong interdependence and particularly capable of prompting the we-frame.  
Our aim is to understand if also in a setting which seems to have all the characteristics to 
stimulate the we-frame because of its payoff structure, the reduction of social distance increases the 
probability that we-frame comes to mind of players.  
 
3.  Experimental Design and Procedure 
 
The experiment is based on a two-player Traveler’s Dilemma in which each player is asked to 
choose a number between 20 and 200 and the size of the penalty or reward is 20.
5 Let us call n1 and 
n2 the numbers chosen by player 1 and player 2 respectively. Following the standard game rules, if 
n1 = n2, both players receive n1 tokens (1 token = 0.05 euro); if n1 > n2, player 1 receives n2-20 
                                                
5 The instructions of the experiment are available from the authors upon request.   10
tokens and player 2 receives n2 +20 tokens; finally, if n1 < n2, player 1 receives n1+20 tokens and 
player 2 receives n1-20 tokens. The unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies of this game is n1 = 
n2 =20.  
We compare subjects’ choices under three treatments: Baseline Treatment (BT), Compulsory 
Encounter Treatment (CET) and Voluntary Encounter Treatment (VET). Each subject participates 
in only one treatment. In the BT subjects play the standard Traveler’s Dilemma. In the CET subjects 
play the game after having been informed that they would meet their counterpart at the end of the 
experiment (see Appendix 1 for the timing of the experiment). The meeting consists simply in the 
presentation of the two players after the game and does not involve any post-play activity. In the 
VET, before playing the game, subjects are asked to choose whether they want to meet or not their 
counterpart at the end of the experiment and they are informed that the encounter takes place only if 
both the participants choose to meet the counterpart. In this treatment, after being instructed about 
the game but before playing it, subjects are handed a form with the following question: “Do you 
want to meet, at the end of the experiment, the person you are going to play with?” They are 
informed of the fact that the meeting would take place only if both players replied with a “Yes” and 
they are informed of the counterpart’s decision about the meeting only at the end of the game. 
The CET and the VET introduce a reduction of social distance among players and they were 
implemented  in  order  to  study  their  effect  on  the  adoption  of  team  reasoning  in  a  game 
characterized by the property of strong interdependence.  
In all our treatments, at the end of the game, beliefs about the opponent’s choice are elicited by 
using monetary incentives. In particular, each subject is asked to guess the number chosen by her 
opponent and she is paid 1 euro if the distance between her guess and their opponent’s actual choice 
is less then 10.
6 Finally, subjects are asked to answer a set of socio-demographic and attitudinal 
questions.  
                                                
6 We believe that, in our kind of experiment, a prize exclusively given to the correct guess could be considered too 
difficult to achieve, thereby discouraging players and increasing the likelihood of casual answers. At the same time, 
eliciting procedures based on quadratic scoring rules (Davis and Holt 1993) are useless for a game - like our version of   11
The  experiment  was  run  both  at  the  Experimental  Economics  Laboratory  (EELAB)  of  the 
University  of  Milan  Bicocca  and  at  the  Laboratory  of  Experimental  Economics  (LES)  of  the 
University of Forlì
 7. We ran 2 sessions for the BT (1 in Milan and 1 in Forlì), 2 sessions for the 
CET (1 in Milan and 1 in Forlì), 3 sessions for the VET (1 in Milan and 2 in Forlì). A total of 140 
undergraduate students – 76 in Milan and 64 in Forlì – participated in the experiment. Players were 
given a show – up fee of 3 euro.  
 
4.  I-rational and we-rational behavior: an empirical test of the role of common reason to 
believe within the theory of team reasoning 
 
By considering different pairs of choices and beliefs in the Traveler’s Dilemma we define two 
types of players’ behavior: 
1) Individually rational behavior: a player i behaves as individually rational (IRi) if Ci<Bi(j) or 
Ci =Bi(j) =  B= C , where Ci is the choice of player i, Bi(j) is the expectation of player i on the choice 
of her opponent j,  C is the smallest number that a player can declare and  B is the player’s belief 
that her opponent will declare the smallest number. The individually rational player (i.e., in the 
Bacharach’s  perspective,  a  player  who  frames  the  situation  according  to  the  I-frame)  aims  at 
maximizing her payoff and therefore chooses at least one unit below her belief on the counterpart 
choice (Ci<Bi(j)).
8 Obviously, she is also individually rational if she expects the counterpart to play 
                                                                                                                                                            
the Traveler’s Dilemma - characterized by a large number of possible strategies. The use of tolerance thresholds for 
subjects’  guesses  is  used  in  the  literature  as  a  valid  method  for  eliciting  beliefs  (see  for  example  Charness  and 
Dufwemberg 2006; Croson 2000). 
7 Subjects were recruited by email. They were students included in the mailing list of the two laboratories. Two weeks 
before the experiment they received an email in which the staff invited them to visit the Laboratory’s website for 
information about the experiment and subscriptions. 
8 Since the belief is not necessarily a point estimate but may be a distribution of expected choices, we choose a broader 
concept of individual rationality where a individually rational player may choose not only Ci=Bi(j)-1 but also Ci<Bi(j)-1. 
To understand this point imagine a car driver who drives on a one lane road and respects the rules. He knows that he 
needs  extra  care  to  take  into  account  the  possibility  of  crazy  driver  coming from the  other  direction  that,  when 
overtaking another car, enter his lane. The possibility of meeting this type of drivers will lead him to take a little bit 
extra care in driving.    12
lowest and she does the same (Ci =Bi(j) =  B=  C ). Beliefs are strategically used by players who 
follow I-rationality in order to obtain the reward by undercutting the counterpart’s choice. 
ii)  We-rational  behavior:  a  player  i  behaves  as  we-rational  (WRi)  (i.e.  she  follows  team 
reasoning) if Ci=Bi(j) when Bi(j) =  B = C , where C  is the largest number that a player can declare 
and  B is the player’s belief that her opponent will declare the largest number.  
Moreover, we could wonder if a player may behave according to team reasoning in case her 
belief is not  B. This is the first aspect we want to empirically test in our contribution. According to 
the idea of common reason to believe, there is no way for team reasoning to arise if the belief in the 
counterpart’s choice is different from the maximum. This is because, as in the case of the Prisoners’ 
Dilemma, also in the Traveler’s Dilemma a team may not be created unilaterally. If the choice 
which maximizes the team’s payoff (i.e. Ci=B i(j ))
9 is not observed when players believe that the 
counterpart is not going to choose the maximum bid while it is commonly endorsed when the 
beliefs are equal to the maximum, we will conclude that the common reason to believe has a central 
role in team reasoning.  
To test this idea, let us start by considering the possible {choice, belief} outcomes which stem 
from  the existence  of  Individually  rational  behavior  and  We-rational  behavior.  There  are  three 
cases: 
a)  {IRi,Ei[IRj]
10} and {IRi, Ei[WRj]}! {Ci < Bi(j) and Ci =C if Bi(j)=  B}
11 
If player i frames the situation according to the I-frame, irrespectively of her expectation on the 
counterparts’ type, she will try to obtain the prize by undercutting the other player’s choice, i.e. she 
will play Ci < Bi(j). Obviously, in case player i believes that the counterpart is going to choose the 
minimum bid she will opt for the minimum too (Ci =C if Bi(j)=  B).  
 
                                                
9 In the Traveler’s Dilemma, a player who endorses team reasoning and has a belief B i(j)  B   , will maximize the joint 
outcome by choosing Ci=B i(j)  B   . 
10 Ei is the player i's expectation about the type of her opponent. 
11See footnote 7 for the motivation of our decision not to restrict individual rationality to C=B-1.    13
b)  {WRi,Ei[WRj]}! {Ci = C , Bi(j)= B} 
If player i expects that the counterpart will frame the situation in terms of we-frame and she does 
the same, she will play highest under the expectation that the counterpart will play highest.  
c)  {WRi,Ei[IRj]}! {Ci = Bi(j)  B   } (only if common reason to believe does not have a relevant 
role in team reasoning theory). 
If players who choose a number equal to their belief even when Bi(j)  B    do exist, we should 
conclude that the common reason to believe does not have a relevant role in team reasoning theory. 
Otherwise, we should conclude that the confidence in the counterpart’s behavior is fundamental to 
allow team reasoning.  
Table 2 summarizes the experimental data from our Traveler’s Dilemma by considering the 
previous analysis in terms of choice and belief.    14
Table 2. Choice and belief in the Traveler’s Dilemma (Total Sample) 
 
Type of behavior  Combination  of  {choice,belief} 
solutions  compatible  with  the 
defined types 








Minimum bid    Ci = C   3  2.14 
Maximum bid    Ci = C   35  25.00 
Individually rational behavior, ruling out the possibility of “strategic” beliefs 
which exploit the +/- 10 tolerance*  
{IRi,Ei[IRj]} and {IRi,Ei[WRj]}  {Ci = C , B i(j)=  B }  or 
{Ci<B i(j), Bi(j)> B } 
52  (only  in 
one case {Ci 
=C , B i(j)= 
B }) 
37.14 
We-rationality  being  common  knowledge,  ruling  out  the  possibility  of 
“strategic” beliefs which exploit the +/- 10 tolerance** 
{WRi,Ei[WRj]}  {Ci = C , Bi(j)= B }  15  10.71 
Individually rational behavior including “strategic” beliefs which exploit the 
+/- 10 tolerance* 
{IRi,Ei[IRj]}  and  {IRi,Ei[WRj]} 
adjusted  for  the  +/-  10  belief  prize 
tolerance 
{Ci =C , Bi(j)=  B  or Bi(j)= 
B  + 1 0 }  or  {Ci<B i ( j ) , 
Bi(j)> B } 
52  (only  in 
one case {Ci 
=C , B i(j)= 
B }) 
37.14 
We-rationality being common knowledge including “strategic” beliefs which 
exploit the +/-10 tolerance** 
{WRi,Ei[WRj]}  adjusted  for  the  +/- 
10 belief prize tolerance 
{Ci =  C , B i(j)=  B  o r  
Bi(j)= B -10 } 
28  20.00 
We-rational choice without team preferences being common knowledge when 
the player does not expect the counterpart to be a we-rational, ruling out the 
possibility of “strategic” beliefs which exploit the +/- 10 tolerance** 
{WRi,Ei[IRj]}  
 
Ci=Bi(j) w i t h  B  i ( j )   ! 1 9 0  
and B i ( j ) <  B (and B i ( j ) ! 
B ) 
4  2.86 
We-rational choice without team preferences being common knowledge when 
the  player  does  not  expect  the  counterpart  to  be  a  we-rational  including 
“strategic” beliefs which exploit the +/- 10 tolerance* 
{WRi,Ei[IRj]}  
 
Ci=Bi(j) with B i(j) <  B  (and  
B i(j) !  B ) 
9  6.43 
* Given the possibility of getting the prize for the belief even in case of a +/- 10 error, we consider that “strategic” players may declare a belief of 30 even though their true belief is lower than 30 (in 
particular  it could be equal to 20). If players declare a belief lower than 30 they are not exploiting this opportunity and therefore we assume that their declared beliefs correspond to the true ones.   
** Given the possibility of getting the prize for the belief even in case of a +/- 10 error, we consider that “strategic” players may declare a belief of 190 or higher than 190 even though their true 
belief is higher than 190 (in particular  it could be equal to 200). If players declare a belief higher than 190 they are not exploiting this opportunity and therefore we assume that their declared beliefs 
correspond to the true ones.   15
We resume our main findings from Table 2 as follows: 
i)  A significant part of players endorse team reasoning, even though, as a whole, individual 
rationality is more widespread than we-rationality  
If we do not consider the possibility of “strategic” belief (given the possibility of getting the 
prize for the belief even in case of a +/- 10 error, players may declare a belief of 190 (30) even 
though their true belief is equal to 200 (30)) data show that 52 players (37.14% of the total sample) 
endorsed I-rationality and 15 players (10.71%) endorsed we-rationality by choosing Ci = C =  B 
(the  number  of players who endorsed  we-rationality by  choosing Ci =  C =  B  increases to  28 
(20.00%) if we consider “strategic” belief). 
We also note that only 3 players chose the minimum bid and 35 chose the maximum one. In 
particular, note  that only one player followed recursive reasoning believing that the counterpart 
knows or acts according to it (i.e. there is only one player who declares the minimum believing that 
her counterpart was doing the same). 
ii)  The undercutting choice largely prevails over we-rationality choice when the expectation on 
the counterpart choice is not the upper bound one: This supports the idea that the common 
reason to believe works well within the theory of team reasoning. 
For Bi(j)<B, we find that cases in which Ci<Bi (51 players) are much more than those in which 
Ci=Bi (9 players if we do not consider the possibility of “strategic” belief and 4 players if we do)
12. 
It seems that, outside the “implicit agreement” around the {C i,  C j} choice, individually rational 
behavior largely dominates team rational one. This reveals a significant role of common reason to 
believe in explaining the internal logic of team reasoning. This conclusion is supported by two other 
empirical  results.  First,  the  60%  of  players  (15  out  of  25)  with  belief  equal  to  the  maximum 
endorsed  team  reasoning  by  choosing  the  maximum  number.  Second,  a  significant  number  of 
players who choose the maximum (15 out of 35 if we do not consider the possibility of “strategic” 
                                                
12 5 players declared a belief equal to 190 and chose 190. These players may be individually rational players who 
exploited the possibility of strategic belief (that means that their actual belief was higher than 190). In this case, by 
choosing 190 they tried to obtain the prize and not to maximize the team output.    16
belief and 28 out of 35 if we do )
13 believed that their counterpart was going to play C  (notice that 
cannot  be  excluded  that  belief  and  the  fact  that  the  we-mode  comes  to  mind  are  reciprocally 
affected). 
iii)  There is a large share of players who choose  Ci>B i ( j ) . They may be defined “irrational” 
player, in the sense that they do not endorse either I-rationality, nor we-rationality  
Apart from players who reveal to be I-rational and we-rational, there is a large part of players who 
choose Ci>B i(j). The share of such players is 45.71. The reason behind the behavior of these players 
is not the aim of this paper. For an explanation of this evidence, see Becchetti, Degli Antoni and 
Faillo 2009).  
 
5.  Reduction of social distance and we-frame 
 
In Table 3 we analyze choices and beliefs when the social distance between players is reduced 
by introducing a meeting after the game.  
The most relevant difference across the three treatments characterizing our Traveler’s Dilemma 
(baseline treatment, compulsory encounter treatment and voluntary encounter treatment) is the rise 
of the {Ci = C , B i(j)=  B} belief/choice pair in the compulsory meeting treatment (17.5 percent 
against 7.5 in the baseline).
14 Essentially, when players know that they will meet after the game, it 
is more likely that they endorse the we-frame and that they believe that the counterpart is going to 
do the same. We interpret this result as a positive and significant effect of the reduction of social 
distance on the probability that the we-frame comes to mind.  
                                                
13 13 players who declared a belief equal to 190 chose a number equal to the maximum (200). As in the case described 
in the previous footnote, our interpretation is that these 13 players may have used the +/- 10 belief prize tolerance to 
declare a belief equal to 190 even though their actual belief was 200. In any case, even by excluding the percentage of 
players who chose the  maximum  having a  belief equal to 200 is much higher that the percentage of play ers who 
endorsed  team  reasoning  by  having  se  players,  15  players believed that the counterpart was  going to  played  the 
maximum  percentage of players adopting we-reasoning is significantly higher among players having a belief equal to 
200 that If we exclude these players, the number of players who declare the maximum number having the hi If we 
consider that the out of if we consider that 13 players who choose the maximum and declared a belief equal to 190 
could actually have a belief equal to 200 (the decision to declare a belief lower than their actual belief would be due to 
the). They are 15 out of 33 if we do not consider these 13 players.   
14 This difference (30% against 27.5%) is less evident when strategic beliefs are considered.   17
By contrast, we do not find a significant effect of the different treatments to the probability to 
behave as an I-rational player. The effect of the compulsory meeting on the number of we-rational 
players is due to the reduction of “irrational” players (the ones who choose a number higher than 
their belief). In fact, the percentage of this kind of players is significantly lower in the compulsory 
meeting treatment (42.5%) with respect to the baseline (50%).  
Finally, the possibility of the meeting introduced in the Voluntary Encounter Treatment does not 
positively affect the probability of endorsing team reasoning. In this treatment, players are informed 
of the opponent’s decision about the meeting only after the game is ended. Subjects’ behavior 
suggests that the mere option of the encounter is not enough to make the we-frame more likely. A 
possible explanation is that players anticipate that subjects who do not endorse team reasoning may 
decide not to meet the counterpart avoiding the encounter and, consequently, avoiding the reduction 
of social distance. This interpretation is confirmed by data on subjects who decide not to meet the 
counterpart when the option is available. The percentage of individually rational player among 
players who refuse to meet the counterpart in the voluntary encounter treatment is much higher than 
in the other sub-sample. This suggests two possible considerations. First, the I-rational players are 
more likely to refuse instead of accepting the encounter. Second, while the possibility to agree on a 
voluntary meeting does not prompt the we-mode, the possibility  to refuse a  voluntary meeting 
seems to stimulate the I-mode. This essentially seems to help players to cancel the idea that the 
game is played by two members of a team. 
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Table 3. Choice and belief in the Traveler’s Dilemma (breakdown by experiment design) 
Type of behavior  Combination  of 
{choice,belief} 
solutions  compatible 
with the defined types 












Minimum bid    Ci = C   2.50  0  3.33  0  6.25 
Maximum bid    Ci = C   27.50  30.00  20.00  25.00  15.63 
Individually  rational  behavior,  ruling  out  the 
possibility of “strategic” beliefs which exploit 
the +/- 10 tolerance*  
{IRi,Ei[IRj]}  and 
{IRi,Ei[WRj]} 
{Ci = C , B i(j)= 
B }  or  {Ci<B i ( j ) , 
Bi(j)>B } 
32.50 
(only  in 
one  case 
{Ci = C , 
Bi(j)=  B }) 
35.00  (among 
them  for  no 
player  was 
{Ci = C , 
Bi(j)=  B }) 
38.33 (only 
in one case 
{Ci = C , 
Bi(j)=  B }) 
35.71 
(only  in  one 
case {Ci =C , 
Bi(j)= B }) 
43.75  (only 
in  one  case 
{Ci = C , 
Bi(j)=  B }) 
We-rationality  being  common  knowledge, 
ruling out the possibility of “strategic” beliefs 
which exploit the +/- 10 tolerance** 
{WRi,Ei[WRj]}  {Ci =  C , B i(j)= 
B } 
7.50  17.50  8.33  7.14  9.38 
Individually  rational  behavior  including 
“strategic”  beliefs  which  exploit  the  +/-  10 
tolerance* 
{IRi,Ei[IRj]}  and 
{IRi,Ei[WRj]}  adjusted 
for  the  +/-  10  belief 
prize tolerance 
{Ci =C , Bi(j)=  B  
or Bi(j)=  B  +10} 
or  {Ci<B i ( j ) , 
Bi(j)>B } 
32.50 
(only  in 
one  case 
{Ci = C , 
Bi(j)=  B }) 
35.00 (only in 
one  case  {Ci 
=C , B i(j)= 
B }) 
38.33 (only 
in one case 
{Ci = C , 
Bi(j)=  B }) 
35.71 
(only  in  one 
case {Ci =C , 
Bi(j)= B }) 
43.75  (only 
in  one  case 
{Ci = C , 
Bi(j)=  B }) 
We-rationality  being  common  knowledge 
including “strategic” beliefs which exploit the 
+/-10 tolerance** 
{WRi,Ei[WRj]} 
adjusted for the +/- 10 
belief prize tolerance 
{Ci =  C , B i(j)= 
B  or Bi(j)=  B -10 
} 
27.50  30.00  16.67  17.86  27.50 
We-rational  choice  without  team  preferences 
being  common  knowledge  when  the  player 
does  not  expect  the  counterpart  to  be  a  we-
rational, ruling out the possibility of “strategic” 
beliefs which exploit the +/- 10 tolerance** 
{WRi,Ei[IRj]}  
 
Ci=Bi(j) w i t h  B  i ( j )  
! 190 and B  i ( j ) < 
B (and B i(j) !  B ) 
2.50  0  6.67  10.71  3.31 
We-rational  choice  without  team  preferences 
being  common  knowledge  when  the  player 
does  not  expect  the  counterpart  to  be  a  we-
rational  including  “strategic”  beliefs  which 
exploit the +/- 10 tolerance* 
{WRi,Ei[IRj]}  
 
Ci=Bi(j) w i t h  B  i ( j )  
<  B  (and  B i(j) ! 
B ) 
7.50  5.00  6.67  10.71  3.13 
* Given the possibility of getting the prize for the belief even in case of a +/- 10 error, we consider that “strategic” players may declare a belief of 30 even though their true belief is lower than 30 (in 
particular  it could be equal to 20). If players declare a belief lower than 30 they are not exploiting this opportunity and therefore we assume that their declared beliefs correspond to the true ones.   
** Given the possibility of getting the prize for the belief even in case of a +/- 10 error, we consider that “strategic” players may declare a belief of 190 or higher than 190 even though their true 
belief is higher than 190 (in particular  it could be equal to 200). If players declare a belief higher than 190 they are not exploiting this opportunity and therefore we assume that their declared beliefs 
correspond to the true ones. *** Players who opted for the meeting in the voluntary encounter treatment.   19 
6. Conclusions  
The present paper approached the theory of team reasoning from an empirical point of view in 
order to verify:  
1.  the role of the common reason to believe in the theory of team reasoning; 
2.  the effect of the reduction of social distance on the likelihood that we-frame comes to mind 
of players involved in a game characterized by the property of strong interdependence.  
With respect to the first point, we were interested in analyzing if the belief in the other player’s 
behavior is significantly correlated with the adoption of team reasoning. With respect to the second 
point, we reduced the social distance between subjects by introducing in a standard Travelers’ 
Dilemma a voluntary and a compulsory meeting between the two paired players and we studied the 
effect of these two treatments on the probability that team reasoning was endorsed.  
Two main findings characterize our empirical analysis. First, the notion of “common reason to 
believe” used by Sugden (2003) to tackle the so called “internal problem of team reasoning” seems 
appropriately  capture  the  internal  logic  of  team  reasoning.  When  the  belief  is  lower  than  the 
maximum, we find that players who endorse the I-mode are much more than players who follow the 
team  reasoning.  It  seems  that,  outside  the  “implicit  agreement”  around  the  {C i,  C j}  choice, 
individually rational behavior largely dominates team rational one. The role of belief is confirmed 
by  the  fact  that  the  majority  of  players  who  think  that  their  counterpart  is  going  to  play  the 
maximum, endorse the team reasoning. Second, when the meeting is a compulsory characteristic of 
the game, there is a significant increase of players who endorse team reasoning by choosing the 
maximum  under  the  belief  that  also  the  counterpart  is  doing  the  same.  This  result  may  be 
interpreted as a positive and significant effect of the reduction of social distance on the probability 
that the we-frame comes to mind. Players who know that after the game the members of the team 
will meet are more likely to adopt team reasoning. 
Even though different authors used the idea of team reasoning “in different ways, and applied it 
to different but overlapping sets of phenomena” (Sugden 2003, p.166) there is a surprisingly lack of   20 
experimental study on this concept. The present paper aimed at investigating two theoretical issues 
related to the theory of team reasoning by considering an original experimental approach. Our 
empirical findings stimulate further research to verify whether our result on the role of “common 
reason to believe” and on the effect of the reduction of social distance on the endorsement of team 
reasoning may be reinforced or confuted by similar experimental analyses on different games.   21 
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APPENDIX 1 - Timing of the experiment  
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